The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 1992

Keyes, Lucile S.
April 1995
Review of Industrial Organization;Apr1995, Vol. 10 Issue 2, p143
Academic Journal
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission outline an enforcement policy which makes a long overdue break with its predecessors in awarding no decisive or predominant role to market concentration as a criterion of anticompetitive effect. However, the new policy does not provide an adequate substitute criterion: the tests that it prescribes for screening merger proposals are so specified that a potentially large proportion of anticompetitive mergers can escape challenge without showing any promise of improving efficiency. The time is ripe for a comprehensive inquiry aimed at formulating a more satisfactory policy.


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