TITLE

Divine omniscience and knowledge de se

AUTHOR(S)
Nagasawa, Yujin
PUB. DATE
April 2003
SOURCE
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion;Apr2003, Vol. 53 Issue 2, p73
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Patrick Grim argues that God cannot be omniscient because no one other than me can acquire knowledge de se of myself. In particular, according to Grim, God cannot know what I know in knowing that I am making a mess. I argue, however, that given two plausible principles regarding divine attributes there is no reason to accept Grim's conclusion that God cannot be omniscient. In this paper I focus on the relationship between divine omniscience and necessary impossibilities, in contrast to the general trend of research since Aquinas, which has concentrated on the relationship between divine omnipotence and necessary impossibilities.
ACCESSION #
16823583

 

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