April 1997
Philosophical Studies;Apr1997, Vol. 86 Issue 1, p73
Academic Journal
The article analyzes non-cognitivism, truth and logic in ethics. Non-cognitivism in ethics is the view that ethical statements or, more generally, perhaps evaluative or normative statements of any kind, cannot be true or false. They are not, as it is often said, even candidates for truth-value. That is, normative statements have no truth conditions: there are no possible conditions, either actual or non-actual, which would make them either true or false. The toughest challenge for any non-cognitivist ethical theory is to give an adequate account of the logical behavior of normative statements.


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