The Fire Insurance Scandal

Kilpatrick, Carroll
December 1943
New Republic;12/13/43, Vol. 109 Issue 24, p848
Presents information on arbitrations and indictments related to the sale of fire insurances. Case against 198 stock fire-insurance companies, their trade organizations, the Southeastern Underwriters' Association, and 27 individuals with conspiracy to fix and maintain arbitrary and non-competitive rates in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; Allegations of fixed premiums and rates on fire insurances being sold by insurance companies in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina and Virginia; Effects of violating Sherman Anti-Trust Act on competition in the insurance industry; Lobbying by fire insurance companies to get judgment in their favor.


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