TITLE

Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs

AUTHOR(S)
Card, Robert F.
PUB. DATE
June 2004
SOURCE
Ethical Theory & Moral Practice;Jun2004, Vol. 7 Issue 3, p253
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Elizabeth Anderson claims that states of affairs are merely extrinsically valuable, since we value them only in virtue of the intrinsically valuable (e.g.) persons in those states of affairs. Since it considers states of affairs to be the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson argues that consequentialism is incoherent because it attempts to globally maximize extrinsic value. I respond to this objection by distinguishing between two forms of consequentialist teleology and arguing that Anderson's claim is either harmless or her argument for the claim is uncompelling. On the first conception of teleology, consequentialists need not hold that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, which allows them to deflect this criticism. On the second account of teleology, even assuming that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson's argument does not necessarily defeat such views.
ACCESSION #
14579020

 

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