Intelligence Differences

Hosenball, Mark
August 2004
Newsweek;8/2/2004, Vol. 144 Issue 5, p8
Reports that Great Britain and the United States have been disagreeing on matters related to Iraq intelligence. U.K. belief that despite forgery of supporting documents, there is credible evidence that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger; U.S. belief that this is a contrived notion; Difference in opinions regarding the credibility of German informant "Curve Ball."


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