Whistle while you work

November 2002
Management Services;Nov2002, Vol. 46 Issue 11, p18
Academic Journal
Reports that the Office of Fair Trading of Great Britain is consulting industry and public organizations on immunity for whistle blowers providing information on cartel activities.


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