The Relation between Formal and Informal Logic

Johnson, Ralph H.
August 1999
Argumentation;Aug1999, Vol. 13 Issue 3, p265
Academic Journal
The issue of the relationship between formal and informal logic depends strongly on how one understands these two designations. While there is very little disagreement about the nature of formal logic, the same is not true regarding informal logic, which is understood in various (often incompatible) ways by various thinkers. After reviewing some of the more prominent conceptions of informal logic, I will present my own, defend it and then show how informal logic, so understood, is complementary to formal logic.


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