Institutional investors in Bulgarian corporate governance reform: obstacles or facilitators?

Belev, Boyan
November 2003
Journal of World Business;Nov2003, Vol. 38 Issue 4, p361
Academic Journal
Institutional investors can play a special role in corporate governance reform given their dual status as both objects and subjects of corporate governance. In transition economies these investors can turn into an obstacle to good governance practices because of inconsistency of their strategy with the reform goals, internal mechanisms of corporate control precluding equitable treatment of shareholders, and serious problems with transparency and disclosure. The expected positive role of institutional investors as subjects of corporate governance may be problematic if they adopt a strategy of accommodation with the anti-reform status quo.


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