The emergence of corporate governance in Russia

Puffer, Sheila M.; McCarthy, Daniel J.
November 2003
Journal of World Business;Nov2003, Vol. 38 Issue 4, p284
Academic Journal
This article tracks the emergence of corporate governance through four stages of the Russia�s transition to a market economy from the mid-1980s to the present: commercialization, privatization, nomenklatura, and statization. For each stage, the government�s economic objectives are summarized, as well as the foundations for the development of and inhibitors to corporate governance. The problems of nondisclosure and nontransparency that made Russia one of the riskiest countries for investment are discussed. The article emphasizes the substantial progress made recently, culminating in the 2002 Corporate Code of Conduct. The article concludes with prospects for corporate governance to be considered by investors, including foreign executives and managers interested in direct investment in Russia.


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