TITLE

Multiple Stackelberg variational responses

AUTHOR(S)
Nagy, Szilárd
PUB. DATE
September 2015
SOURCE
Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Mathematica;Sep2015, Vol. 60 Issue 3, p471
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Contrary to the standard literature (where the Stackelberg response function is single-valued), we provide a whole class of functions to show that the Stackelberg variational response set may contain at least three elements.
ACCESSION #
110460533

 

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