Properly efficient Nash equilibrium in multicriteria noncooperative games

Fahem, Karima; Radjef, Mohammed
October 2015
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research;Oct2015, Vol. 82 Issue 2, p175
Academic Journal
The aim of this paper is to study the concept of properly efficient equilibrium for a multicriteria noncooperative strategic game. Using results of multicriteria optimization programming, we give some characterizations and existence results of this concept in the considered game.


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