TITLE

Reflections on the Structure and Origin of Pareto Income Distributions

AUTHOR(S)
Kopperer, H. C.
PUB. DATE
August 1998
SOURCE
Quality & Quantity;Aug98, Vol. 32 Issue 3, p213
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The essay takes the reader on a voyage of exploration with the aim of discovering the origin of Pareto-curves. It shows with thought-experiments backed up by computer-simulation the generation of log-normal curves in detail. Extending forward this conceptual trajectory, it arrives via a quasi-Newtonian "fuxion"-insight - intinitessimal differential integration - at a novel mathematical concept: Pareto-curves are simply special log-normal curves where a large number of random-factors interacted and impacted at their genesis (the author called it the "Kopp-effect").
ACCESSION #
10191598

 

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