TITLE

Global CEO Turnover at Record Highs

PUB. DATE
July 2003
SOURCE
Financial Executive;Jul/Aug2003, Vol. 19 Issue 5, p10
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
This article reports on the global turnover rate for chief executive officers (CEO). The author examines a 2002 survey conducted by the technology consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton that found that CEO turnover is accelerating faster in Asia and Europe than in North America. Charles Lucier, senior vice president of Booz Allen, noted that this finding suggests that this phenomenon is fully global and turnover is occurring in regions where companies are not as burdened by corporate governance regulations as in the U.S. The author also discusses some of the other interesting findings of the study such as nearly 40% of CEO departures being forced and that boards of directors appear to be becoming less forgiving for underperformance.
ACCESSION #
10161109

 

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