TITLE

Charles Peirce's Arguments for the Non-probabilistic Validity of Induction

AUTHOR(S)
Cheng, Chung-Ying
PUB. DATE
March 1967
SOURCE
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society;Spring1967, Vol. 3 Issue 1, p24
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Examines the arguments of Charles Sanders Peirce for the non-probabilistic validity of induction. Details of Peirce's notion of validity; Notion of self-correcting nature of induction; Discussion on the notion of truth which affects the validity of inductive method.
ACCESSION #
10092006

 

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